Terrorism isn’t an act of desperation fueled by a desire for revenge it’s a military tactic fueled by large sums of cash – large sums of Saudi cash. Joel Mowbray, writing for the National Review, has the details. The attack in Bali cost more than $1 million.
Seven Saudis — whom U.S. officials have asked allies to keep tabs on — are dubbed the “main individual sponsors of terrorism”:
Khalid bin Mahfouz (banker): Bin Mahfouz was the CEO of the National Commercial Bank (the first commercial bank in Saudi Arabia) until 1999 — when it was discovered in an audit that he had funneled around $100 million to his brother-in-law, Osama bin Laden. (Interesting historical fact: Bin Mahfouz paid over $200 million in fines in 1991 for misdeeds when he was COO of BCCI.)
Saleh Abdullah Kamel (banker): Kamel was the co-founder and large shareholder of Al Shamal Bank in Sudan, bin Laden’s bank of choice from 1983 onward. Kamel’s bank was used extensively for al Qaeda operations, according to trials stemming from the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings.
Abdullah Suleiman al Rajhi (banker): Al Rajhi is the CEO and founder of Al Rajhi Bank, which serves as a go-between for charities seeking to funnel money to al Qaeda.
Adel Abdul Jalil Batterjee (businessman): Batterjee is the founder of the Benevolence International Foundation — and its main financier.Mohammed Hussein al Amoudi (businessman): Al Amoudi is the chairman of one of the largest conglomerates in the Kingdom, and he has partnered with bin Mahfouz on a number of oil-related ventures. He was the president of the Al Haramain Foundation in Sudan, which was shut down for its suspected involvement in the U.S. embassy bombings in East Africa.
Wael Hamza Julaidan (businessman): Julaidan is the chairman of the Muslim World League in Pakistan and of its financial arm, Rabita Trust. That, and he’s a cofounder of al Qaeda.
Yasin al Qadi (businessman): Al Qadi is an investor in several front companies, and he is the head of the Al Haramain Foundation.The report principally covers the financial side of al Qaeda, if for no other reason than because money serves as the cornerstone of the terrorist network. The main al Qaeda operations of the last four years — including the U.S. embassy bombings in East Africa, 9/11, and the recent Bali bombings — cost a collective $1 million or more. Though the materials and logistics necessary to carry out the actual attacks may be inexpensive, the bulk of the money (some 90 percent) goes to cover the costs of infrastructure.
But the biggest expense to propagate the growth of radical Islam is not paid for directly by al Qaeda, but by Saudi Arabia: the madrassas that that churn out rabid young Islamic fundamentalists primed for jihad. If nothing else, Saudi Arabia’s continued insistence on fueling the spread of Wahhabism raises perhaps the ultimate question about whether the House of Saud is a friend or foe: “How can a war against terrorism succeed while the United States has excluded or preserved countries such as Saudi Arabia, which tolerates the emergence of fundamentalism, sometimes instrumentalized [its] goal, and today has become [its] sanctuary?”
The Saudis still have good friends in the State Department.
The good news is that Mowbray is no longer being threatened by State, and victims of 9/11 are suing the Saudis for billions. The bad news is that terrorism is still well-funded. Saudi money is still funding the growth of Islamic fundamentalism and the State Department is still on their side. More than a year after Sept. 11, nothing has changed.
How many people will die in the next Saudi-funded attack? How many people in the Saudi-funded State Department give a damn?
Mary P. Madigan 